Daily Report

Latin America

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Cuba

Castro Arrives, Discusses USSR Visit

PA090340 Havana Cubavision Television in Spanish 0140 GMT 9 Nov 87

["Exclusive" interview with President Fidel Castro by unidentified Cubavision reporter at Havana's Jose Marti International Airport on 8 November—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Commander, we know you are tired, but we would like to ask three questions.

[Castro] Three questions? [chuckles]

[Reporter] Yes, very short ones. [laughs]

[Castro] Three?

[Reporter] Well, we can summarize everything into three questions. May we ask them?

[Castro] Yes, you may.

[Reporter] We have closely followed all the information that has recently arrived from the Soviet Union concerning the celebration of the revolution's 70th anniversary. However, we would like to hear details about three things: First, the results of your meeting with Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev; second, your evaluation of the working meeting held by various parties in Moscow; and third, your personal views in general about the celebration to mark the Great October Revolution, which has become such an important event.

[Castro] The results of my meeting with Gorbachev were excellent, really excellent. I saw some news reports that talked...[changes thought] that were mere speculations. International news agencies' reports datelined Moscow said that I would discuss economic problems and... [changes thought] well, all kinds of nonsense. We talked about important issues: international politics, the reorganization being implemented in the Soviet Union, the reorganization being implemented here—in sum, various important topics. We also analyzed the conference, especially a number of ideas about the foreign debt, Third World problems, disarmament and development—in sum, it is a long list. I will not even try to summarize the topics, because I think I should be discreet about the topics we discussed, since we talked about a variety of matters. However, we discussed matters in general, all related to the current international situation, our joint experiences—all within a friendly and cordial atmosphere, marked by mutual understanding. Therefore, I was satisfied with the interview.

I also received all kinds of attention—I might describe them as exceptional—by Comrade Gorbachev on innumerable occasions. In other words, he treated me with a deference, interest, and friendliness that might be described as exceptional. Therefore, from that viewpoint, I could say that the effort was worthwhile. They were very happy with my presence. I could not arrive earlier because I had a previously scheduled visit (by Yugoslav President Lazar Mojsov). I did not realize that the solemn ceremony was going to be held on 1 and 2 November. Well, that's the way the trip was planned. They know about the distance, the travel difficulties; they know that certain security measures have to be taken—all that. They were very appreciative of the fact that I participated in the festivities. They were brief but I was able to arrive in time for the second day of the meeting of Communist, Labor, and leftist parties and organizations. I was able to attend the parade, which was splendid, very beautiful. We were there for about 2 and 1/2 hours. The temperature was not very low but it was cold. It was 8 or 9 degrees but windy. It was like a freezer! But it was all very nice.

As I was telling you, I was able to get to the meeting. The meeting was truly extraordinary, because it was something new. This was a topic we had discussed in an earlier meeting with Gorbachev—the prospects of holding a meeting of this kind. We exchanged views about the nature of the meeting. He asked my opinion, I made a few suggestions. The meeting was organized this way (word indistinct). It was all-encompassing. It not only consisted of Communist Parties; there were Communist, Labor, Socialist, Social Democratic Parties, leftist forces. Even the ecologists, the FRG's Greens were there. It was held at one of the Kremlin's reception rooms. I do now know how it looked on television, but it was shaped like a square.

It was made up of tables placed in such a way as to form a square, and I estimate there were about 160 persons in the first line. There were other lines behind, of members of delegations; and even a third line, we might say.

But it was an impressively solemn scene. We were about 30 or 35 meters from those who were in front of us. This was not entirely a square, but rather like a rectangle. There was a distance of about 35 meters between the place where we were sitting and those who were across from us. Mengistu was there, as well as Sam Nujoma, and other leaders that one could make out with a certain difficulty. Gorbachev was sitting in the middle, on one of the sides. Two of the lateral lines had about 50 seats each. The shortest had about 30 seats, with an entrance to one of the sides. All of it looked very solemn. The people spoke sitting down. When their turn came, they spoke. The speeches had to be brief, from 10 to 12 minutes. Some took slightly longer. Very interesting opinions were expressed there.

I was not present the 1st day, but I learned what many of the speeches had been about. On the day I spoke, many speeches were made, perhaps more than 30. In general, all statements were most interesting; there were various points of view, an atmosphere of understanding, of respect, of freedom in all of the statements. Some of

them were even critical of some Soviet things; they mentioned, for instance, Afghanistan, or the ecologists would speak against the use of nuclear energy. In general, however, they were all made in a very respectful tone, recognizing the efforts the USSR is making for peace.

I would say the meeting was a historic one because of its content and its characteristics. Perhaps never, in the last 70 years, had communist and social democratic parties met. They reflected the amplitude of this moment we are living through right now, the force of this struggle for peace, and they reflected the increasing prestige of the Soviet Union. All of the speeches were heard with much attention.

At the end, there was the eternal problem we experienced here on the occasion of the foreign debt conference; there were about 300 speakers at that conference. In Moscow, there were not so many, but still there were about 119, and only 63 of them were able to speak. The speakers placed their names on the list, and there was a certain type of selection. Of course, we discussed the possibility of prolonging the meeting 1 more day, but the problem would not have been solved with just half a day, so they adopted the same formula we used here, that is, the speeches were published in the newspapers. Of course, had there been more time, perhaps 1 more day, fewer people would have been left with the desire to speak, because the desire to be heard was very generalized.

I spoke briefly with Gorbachev and asked him how he was going to solve the problem, and we exchanged impressions about it. The argument he used was that there were still so many left that half a day would not resolve anything. Perhaps about 15 or 20 more could have spoken in half a day, and almost all in 1 day. In the end, their opinion was solicited. Of course, I did not want to give my opinion, because I had already spoken, and it seemed to me that only those who had not spoken should give their opinion. It was decided by applause. As I had been talking with some of them, I had perceived there was anxiety as to whether there would be the opportunity to speak, and that is why I was concerned as to whether or not it would have been worthwhile to make a little extra effort, even if not all of them could speak. But there were 63 speeches, an unforgettable experience, and in my opinion, the type of meeting that must continue in the future.

That is all I can tell you about the meeting. Concerning the general impression, it was a great celebration; there was much enthusiasm among the people; the parade was very beautiful; there was great interest throughout the world about the event. One must take into consideration the present moment, the fact that within exactly 1 month there will be Gorbachev's trip to the United States to sign the agreement on medium-range and operational [as heard] missiles, and this has an extraordinary importance in the history of the world, because it could mean a first step in a very promising direction. I feel that this is fundamentally a result of the USSR's efforts and Gorbachev's personal efforts.

We have lived through a historic moment. The Soviet leaders were very kind with this delegation, very affectionate; they had great interest in my trip, in my presence there. All of them kept asking Carlos Rafael when I was arriving. In town, many people asked him when I was coming. They placed much importance on the fact that I would be there; they placed even more importance on it than I myself did. I could not attach so much importance to my presence there, but they seemed to value my presence there very much. They all reflected a great satisfaction that I was there. I have classified this trip as the best that I ever took, as the happiest trip I ever took to the Soviet Union.

If we analyze all the factors, the content of the talks with the Soviets, the content of the talks with Gorbachev... [changes thought] and we spoke so many times; we talked a great number of times; they invited me to go to the mausoleum; they invited me to go first with Gorbachev, Gromyko, and Ryzhkov. I was embarrassed; I was trying to be apart, but they sought me out, called me, placed me alongside them. I was trying to stand a little farther away, and they came and grabbed me by the hand and placed me there, and there I stood between Ryzhkov and Gromyko. Here was Gorbachev, and there was no interpreter. I had to resort to my English. You can imagine how long it has been since I last spoke English. The funny part is that we understood one another. I spoke for a long time with Gromyko, even about historical things, because Gromyko is an encyclopedia. He has met many personalities. I asked him if he had spoken much with Stalin, and he said yes, many times. I asked him if he had known Roosevelt. During the war, he was Soviet ambassador to Washington.

He has met personalities of all types in this world, had experiences of all types. We spoke about the place where he was born; the year he was born, 1908; how he studied; where he studied—all of this in English. I asked him if he were writing about all of those remembrances. He is indeed writing. He explained to me all he is doing—I do not know whether he has said this to others—he told me all he is doing. I asked him if he is using many documents or if he is relying mostly on his memory. He has a great memory; he really remembers; he has really lived the events. He looks healthy; he looks mentally alert and physically well.

Afterward, at the reception, Gorbachev invited me to sit alongside him, and we talked a lot. He called an interpreter. Gromyko was there and helped a bit, but he sent for the interpreter. No, Gromyko was a little bit further away. We almost spoke in sign language. At that moment, the spectacle was going on. He spoke about the songs, the type of Russian song. There was a couple from Georgia who danced ballet, and they looked more like Cubans, and then another couple came on. Russian

types, and he told me—and I could understand that—that this couple was more temperamental and that the other couple was more technical. Then he joked about this. At one point, I mentioned the diversity of types that reflect the multinational state, and he made a joke about the fact that there had been the Russian type and how thanks to the emperor everything had mixed. He is very witty and affable. We understood one another.

Then, to speak about other things, he invited the translator. Afterward, he took me over to his family, where his wife was, and the other ladies. We were separated from them by a table, and he went over to that side, greeted many people. I greeted all the members of the Politburo. We have many friends there, many old friends in an excellent atmosphere.

Analyzing the results of all the meetings, the exchanges of points of view, the exchanges of opinions, the expressions of what we were doing, the great agreement, the extraordinary similarity in viewpoints, and the understanding of the processes that we are carrying out, the agreement on such a quantity of international problems was so great that I felt happy. I felt truly happy. When I said goodbye to Ryzhkov, I told him: Comrade, tell him that this has been my happiest trip to the Soviet Union, and such a short one, too. I believe a tremendous perspective is opening in our relations regarding communication, exchange of ideas—Gorbachev's memory is incredible! He does not forget even the smallest detail. He recalled all of the things we discussed the last time; he mentioned one detail, and another, and another. He is a sponge. He has a capacity to listen and to understand. He shows enormous interest in all matters. Undoubtedly, he has great empathy toward Cuba; he is interested in Cuban matters, but he is also interested in Third World problems, economic problems, the problems of the debt.

We could say that one keystone of his foreign policy concepts has as its basis the aspects of underdevelopment, the economic crisis, the debt, the need for a new international economic order, and the problems of unequal trade. The big battle we have been waging in the Nonaligned Movement over the debt fits into the Soviet foreign policy conceptions.

His speech should be known. We plan to publish a pamphlet with Gorbachev's entire speech. While I was not present, I received a copy in Spanish before leaving. I read it carefully during the trip. It has much information. He also spoke briefly at the meeting. All this was in the same framework. It can be said that the big battle we have been waging for years fits and matches the big battle for peace that the Soviet Union has been waging and that has become one of the pillars of current Soviet foreign policy.

Something that has really pleased me and made me enthusiastic is that for some time this was a battle of the Third World countries, our battle only. Now it is a battle of the Soviet Union as well. Now it is part of the Soviet conception of the world's must acute problems.

Now our struggle is strengthened by this Soviet struggle for peace, by this conception of disarmament and peace for development, for a new international economic order, for the well-being of all the people. It is being greatly strengthened. New and very important theoretical propositions have been made, as when Gorbachev asks: Can imperialism and capitalism renounce neocolonialism? Can capitalism renounce militarism?

Based on the current correlation of forces, on the grave problems that capitalism is facing, on the great strength of world public opinion, on the force of the Third World countries, Gorbachev states the objective possibility of leading the capitalist countries to a state of realism on all these matters in a new era when survival is a vital affair.

Our struggle of so many years has come to completely match this Soviet struggle for peace. Now it is no longer the Third World countries who are struggling; now it is the socialist camp as well; it is the Soviet Union—a great power whose might can be ignored by no one, and it is waving and defending this banner of ours.

[Reporter] You delivered the countries of Latin America? [question as heard]

[Castro] Waving this banner of the Third World countries. This struggle is being waged not only by communist parties but also by parties of various political tendencies. A movement of great strength is emerging. All this is related to Gorbachev's domestic policy and objective of improving socialism in the Soviet Union and promoting whatever reforms and changes are necessary to snatch, so to speak, the banners from capitalism.

I believe he is going to succeed in this. The entire effort is very coherent, and this is why I told you that this moment is of universal historic importance. You can understand with how much interest all the people, especially us, will await the results of these talks on the disarmament issue, because this is an essential premise for the solution of other problems.

Gorbachev is emphasizing not only peace and development matters but also ecological matters, which in the past were banners of some groups in the West which are just now increasing in strength. A very coherent policy has been developed this way.

Of course, we spoke about economic matters—not bilateral matters, but economic matters having to do with the construction of socialism. There was much affinity. I was able to see the great importance that Gorbachev gives to man, to awareness, to political work. This can be perceived only during a private meeting such as the one we held. It was excellent. It was worth traveling thousands of kilometers despite the risks one always has to face. Despite the distance, I believe I never had a more timely, more fruitful, more useful meeting.

It is with this spirit that we all have returned, with this great enthusiasm, to double and triple our work, because our banners have been multiplied, I would say. Our banners—the banner of socialism, that of the Nonaligned Movement, that of the Third World countries—have been multiplied and our force has been multiplied.

I can tell you that I believe we can talk about this subject in a more calm way in the future. I was not mentally prepared to answer these questions. Perhaps we can talk about this more calmly. This experience has been very enriching. I hope to have other opportunities to speak. However, I think I have mentioned some of the essential points concerning my impressions of this trip. It is a fact we are living through an exceptional, an historic, moment.

Our bilateral relations are very good. They are evident in everything, in increasingly more important efforts, in cooperation and development plans. There are plenty of reasons for optimism.

I have been gone only 4 days, and I am impatient to know how things are going on here.

[Reporter] Today is Red Sunday.

[Castro] Yes, it is Red Sunday. We had a Red Sunday also, because we have been working. We had our Red Sunday yesterday. I imagine you worked hard, 8 hours.

[Reporter] They had lunch.

[Castro] Lunch.

[Reporter] They had lunch.

[Castro] I do not know whether it was an easy task to find work for so many volunteer workers.

[Reporter] That was a problem, Commander.

[Castro] I did not know, despite the fact that the media have mentioned this very often, that a massive effort like that could cause inconveniences in that not everyone can find work in their shops.

[Reporter] Everybody wanted to work, the microbrigades showed up, and there were appropriate conditions.

[Castro] We are talking about 500,000 people in those places. This participation almost looks like a demonstration of solidarity, of good will, of good wishes, but...

[Reporter] You cannot work like that...

[Castro] Going to a shop en masse. I do not know to what extent we can keep control in terms of how many people participate. It is possible that in a day like today, more people than would be desirable participate.

[Reporter] Right. Everybody wanted to work.

[Castro] We will have to think about this. But the mere fact that an 8-hour day was worked is good because in the past this was just a morning stroll. I think we have been more serious about this. I am impatient to see how all the work, construction, and other things being done are going.

[Reporter] Today we were in the metal production factory that supplies the microbrigades.

[Castro] What do they produce?

[Reporter] Concrete, wheelbarrows, the winches [preceding word in English].

[Castro] That is the one on the east side, the new one, where the winches are being built. They have big plans for 1988. They will be producing concrete for all the microbrigades.

[Reporter] Twenty-eight hundred next year.

[Castro] And 600 winches.

[Reporter] Seven hundred.

[Castro] I have to talk with Lezcano to ask him how everything is going, how the preparations are progressing for the assembly on 27 and 28 November, which is an important assembly. We have 3 weeks. There is going to be an analysis, a study of the entire rectification process. I hope you will be tnere all the time and that you can report to the people as much as possible on what is discussed there.

I do not know if it has rained.

[Reporter] It has rained; it rained in these past few days, including today.

[Castro] There was this famous little storm; no one knows its name, or where it started, or where it went. Then I was told that it was in the Gulf of Batabano; the initial signs were very visible in the sky, and there was no rain there. But it did produce some rain.

[Reporter] Yes, it rained afterward. Early today it rained in some municipalities.

[Castro] In Havana?

[Reporter] Yes.

[Castro] We need that here very much. The situation of the dams has improved slightly. This of course will not compensate for the harm that the many months of drought did to the sugarcane, but it did improve the water supply situation in the cities of Camaguey, Holguin, and other places. In Havana, we have the new

aqueduct. I hope this drought does not last forever. Nature at some point has to cooperate with rain to enhance the efforts we are making.

Do you have much material already? When are you going to publish that? [Reporter] Tonight, Commander.

[Castro] That is fine. Goodbye.

[Reporter] Thank you.

Castro Attends GOSR Celebration in Moscow

For reportage on the visit of Fidel Castro, President of the Councils of State and Ministers, to the GOSR 70th anniversary celebrations in Moscow, see the GOSR 70th Anniversary section of the 9 November Soviet Union *Daily Report* and subsequent issues.

Cambodian Foreign Trade Minister Visits

FL060048 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 0403 GMT 5 Nov 87

[Text] Cuban Foreign Minister Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz has received Ho Nan, foreign trade minister of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

During the meeting, the two parties examined bilateral trade relations and their perspectives. During the Cambodian official's visit, they will sign a trade agreement and a protocol for 1988.

Cabrisas Ruiz and his Cambodian counterpart also discussed the possibility of cooperation in training technical cadres in foreign trade.

Also present at the meeting were Jose de la Fuente, Cuban vice minister of foreign trade; (Ros Kon), Cambodian ambassador to Cuba; and other members of the two delegations.

Holds Talks With Almeida

FL060407 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 0239 GMT 6 Nov 87

[Text] Commander of the Revolution Juan Almeida Bosque has received Ho Nan, member of the Central Committee of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP] and foreign trade minister.

Ho Nan conveyed a greeting to Almeida from KPRP Secretary General Heng Samrin to Commander in Chief Fidel Castro.

During the meeting, which was held in an atmosphere of fraternal camaraderie, the two leaders exchanged opinions on their respective countries and on the international situation.

Almeida Bosque reiterated the support and solidarity of the party, government, and people of Cuba for the efforts made by the Cambodian Government to normalize the border situation with neighboring countries and to contribute significantly to peace and stability in South East Asia.

Haiti

PUCH Headquarters Attacked 7 November

FL091938 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] A source close to the Unified Party of Haitian Communists [PUCH] said yesterday that a group of armed individuals tried unsuccessfully to break into the PUCH's headquarters in Port-au-Prince on Saturday night [7 November].

Six men, driving a jeep and armed with revolvers, came around to party headquarters several times, but neighbors and other people from the area rose up and prevented the break-in. Members of the PUCH's surveillance service were inside the headquarters and all around it. The men in the jeep were unable to overcome all these obstacles and enter the party headquarters.

During their last attempt to enter, they fired many rounds into the air, in an effort to intimidate the people present. The police were called and began patrolling the area 2 hours after the incident. By that time, the assailants had escaped.

Shots Fired During Rally

FL091946 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] AFP reports that yesterday, Sunday, the Unified Party of Haitian Communists [PUCH] was holding a rally in the densely-populated Bel-Air section of Port-au-Prince in which PUCH Secretary General Rene Theodore, who is also the PUCH's presidential candidate in the coming elections, was participating. Party number two man Max Bourjolly, PUCH candidate for mayor of Port-au-Prince, was present at the rally. An unidentified individual started firing a weapon during the rally and the rally was suspended.

Theodore Interviewed on Namphy

FL092114 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in Creole 1700 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Interview with Rene Theodore, leader of the Unified Party of Haitian Communists [PUCH]—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Reporter] Mr Theodore, how do you feel about the investiture of General Namphy as commander in chief of the Haitian Armed Forces?

[Theodore] Well, it is a decision by decree of the National Government Council. It is a decision they say is in conformity with the regulations which they established, also by decree. In any case, we think that the government that is to be legally installed in Haiti, in accordance with the upcoming elections, will have to be able to consider the decisions that have been made. Perhaps it will even have to review them, depending on whatever agreement is reached through a broad, parliamentary debate. It will have to either rectify or confirm a decision that is perhaps valid, depending on how the country's authorities see it, once the new regime is established. [passage omitted]

Voter Registration Ends; Unofficial Figures Reported

FL092247 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1400 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] Voter registration for the upcoming elections officially ended yesterday, Sunday, 8 November. Many people took advantage of the final registration day and registered at metropolitan open area registration offices.

According to the first unofficial estimates, approximately 2 million voters registered; that is, two-thirds of the total Haitian electorate.

We recall that the registration period, originally scheduled to end on 31 October, was extended a week—until 8 November—because of a delay in the delivery of electoral registers from Venezuela. The country survived the registration period despite several incidents which took place last week, such as various fires at the Provisional Electoral Council headquarters and in various offices [as heard].

Our correspondent in Saint-Marc (Louramo Jean-Pierre) informed us that a very high percentage of that commune's population registered to vote. According to the figures made public by the Communal Electoral Office for the Artibonite area, 14,200 of the 14,284 citizens of voting age in Saint-Marc have registered to vote.

Conference on Haiti Unlikely Before Elections

FL092359 Bridgetown CANA in English 1909 GMT 9 Nov 87

[By Paget de Freitas]

[Excerpts] Kingston, Jamaica, Nov 9, CANA—Diplomatic sources in Kingston expect Haiti's November 29 presidential election to be held on schedule and say that reports of pre-election violence are being over-played in the press.

At the same time, Jamaica Government officials said Monday that Kingston still planned to convene its stalled meeting of English, French and Dutch-speaking Caribbean countries on Haiti, but conceded that this was now unlikely before the elections.

It is a very good chance that the election will be held on the prescribed date. There is a good deal of political will to have the elections, a Kingston-based Western diplomat close to the situation in Haiti told CANA.

If there is a postponement it will be because of shortcomings in the logistics and the administration that has put planning about a week behind schedule, the diplomat said. Senior Jamaican diplomatic and foreign policy officials agreed with the assessment. As of now, we have no indication other than that there is a strong determination to have the elections, one official said. We think that if there is a postponement it is because the administrative arrangements were not possible, he added. [passage omitted]

There has been sporadic outbreaks of violence since Duvalier's exile and reports of the re-emergence of the Tonton Macoutes, the terror gang that helped enforce Duvalier rule.

Last week, the office of the Electoral Council, which is running the election, was gutted by fire after it refused 12 candidates who had close links to the ousted regime. Shots were also fired at the offices of other candidates. But one diplomat, speaking on the basis of intimate knowledge of the situation, said: The press has overwritten the extent of the recent developments. The recent shootings have been confined to Port-au-Prince, except for one incident in Gonaives ...it is also considerably less violence than has been seen in down Kingston (tough urban areas) constituency in a general election, he added. [passage omitted]

Jamaica claimed credit for playing an important role in helping to persuade Jean-Claude Duvalier to go into exile, and the prime minister, Edward Seaga, had expected his Caribbean conference on Haiti to follow soon after last month's Commonwealth summit.

The idea of the meeting is still alive, said an official who has worked on its preparation. The original meeting did not take place because of the people who were to be involved could not come together on the same date.

The invitees included Caribbean Community (Caricom) states, the French departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the territories of the Dutch Antilles, France and Holland and Haiti itself. Some diplomatic sources say Port-au-Prince was lukewarm to the meeting. But senior officials dispute this interpretation. The only reason it was not held was because of timing, one said.

It is expected that the conference will attempt to galvanize political and economic support for Haiti.

With the short time now before the presidential elections, it doesn't now seem very likely that the meeting will take place before the event, the official said.

El Salvador

Rosa Chavez: Rebel Talks Achieve 'Little'

PA100404 San Salvador Television Nacional in Spanish 1400 GMT 8 Nov 87

[Homily by Msgr Gregorio Rosa Chavez, auxiliary bishop of San Salvador, at the Metropolitan Cathedral in San Salvador—live]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In order to maintain peace each and every person must constantly strive to control his or her emotions. We continue working and searching for peace because we firmly believe that each man and woman, regardless of his and her economic background or ideological stand, has the same dignity because they are the children of God.

However, the peace we are searching for does not stop at what justice can offer. It is the result of love. In other words, peace has a deeper significance; it is the image and effect of the peace that Christ brought us when he died on the cross for all men, so all men would reconcile with God and rebuild a single people, a single body. It is the peace that results when each and every one of us puts an end to hatred and his heart is filled with the love that the resurrected Jesus Christ gave us.

In order for us to enjoy that peace, Msgr Arturo Rivera y Damas went last Wednesday to Mexico, where he held a 4-hour meeting with the FDR-FMLN leaders. It is public knowledge what little was achieved during those meetings. May I add that the archbishop has prepared a report he will present to President Duarte as soon as possible.

It is not necessary that we say once again that this peace cannot be built by forcefully controlling the people's freedom of transit or by sabotage actions against the power system or the productive infrastructure of the country. Those actions are part of the methodology of violence. This is the way the most humble people of El Salvador understand this. The Salvadoran people prefer the paths of Esquipulas II. The church supports those people who go to Mariona Penitentiary to pick up their sons who have been granted amnesty. We have supported the amnesty process, in spite of the criticism that has been made.

These people, these humble people, have felt the machineguns of war over their heads. The machineguns of war do not care about the sex or age of the people. We feel there is something positive about the cease-fire ordered by the president of the Republic because it is a sign that announces a willingness to take steps to achieve not just a negotiated cease-fire, but an end to hostilities; in other words, the end of the horrible nightmare of the war. Are we asking for something impossible? [passage omitted]

Mexican Note on Duarte Remarks Cited

PA072127 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 7 Nov 87

[Text] Napoleon Duarte cannot conceive of the fact that certain countries believe that self-determination and national dignity cannot be easily offended. [Words indistinct] Mexico's dignity with statements [words indistinct] shows he is the most stupid president our country has ever had. Given its importance, we read a communique [words indistinct] answering Duarte's statements, where he ridiculously urged the Mexican and Panamanian Governments to not allow the presence of our leaders in their territories.

During statements issued on 5 November in San Salvador in which he referred to the Guatemala agreement's implementation Jose Napoleon Duarte talked about the presence of FMLN-FDR leaders in Mexico. In so doing, however, he did not take into consideration the actual situation in Mexico. Consequently, the Mexican Government stated the following:

1. Contrary to President Duarte's statement, the presence of these organizations' leaders in our territory does not adversely affect the stability of the Salvadoran Government—or any other government—because there are statutes which regulate political refugees' activities and preclude those actions. Likewise, Mexico's strict compliance with the principle of intervention, which is very well-known on an international level, [words indistinct] activities aimed at destabilizing governments in other countries.

2. We deplore that President Jose Napoleon Duarte has issued statements which are groundless. The situation is even more deplorable because, upon specific request from his government, the Mexican authorities have authorized meetings between Salvadoran Government representatives and FMLN-FDR representatives in their own territory. This gesture proves the goodwill and spirit of cooperation prevailing in Mexico. Likewise, upon direct request from President Duarte, the Mexican Government sponsored a dialogue in San Salvador between President Duarte and his government representatives and the FMLN-FDR. It is astonishing that while Salvadoran Foreign Minister Ricardo Acevedo Peralta is fully aware of the role played by Mexico, certain statements are issued to misinform and prevent a cordial, political atmosphere.

3. Mexico has constantly resorted to various methods to help find a negotiated, peaceful solution for Central America. The constructive and firm participation in the Contadora Group's efforts and the unconditional support given to the Guatemala agreement confirm this. It is necessary to achieve this goal for the Central American countries.

Pardoned Prisoners Refuse To Leave Jails

PA091706 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSKL in Spanish 1200 GMT 7 Nov 87

[Text] The National Union of Salvadoran Workers, UNTS, has reported that approximately 100 political prisoners pardoned under the amnesty law refused to leave jail because they did not want to promote the government's propaganda goals.

Justice Minister Julio Alfredo Samayoa reported that 80 inmates of La Esperanza jail and 14 of the women's prison, located 15 km and 9 km from the capital, respectively, received their prison release papers as a result of the amnesty that is in effect and that was part of the Esquipulas II agreement.

Local and international media appeared at the prisons and were interested in reporting the prisoners' release, but there was no release because it was said that no one would leave the jail until the courts issue the last prison release papers.

Meanwhile, UNTS leader Humberto Centeno told DPA that the government intends to spend weeks releasing political prisoners to improve its international image. In addition, he protested the lack of guarantees for the pardoned prisoners and mentioned cases in which three people disappeared after release and instances when three others were killed.

The UNTS and the Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Prisoners are organizing a thanksgiving mass and a people's festival for the day on which the approximately 800 opposition prisoners are to be released.

Meanwhile, the justice minister said that the government is making every effort to release political prisoners within 48 hours. He also said that those who have been pardoned are being held back by companeros of the Salvadoran Political Prisoners Committee, COPPES.

Esquipulas Compliance 'Zeal' Causes Problems

PA082110 San Salvador EL MUNDO (EL UNIVERSITARIO supplement) in Spanish 6 Nov 87 p 19

[Text] The initial 90 days for the implementation of the agreements made in Esquipulas II are coming to an end, and the most recent events in El Salvador, apart from the intentions of the sides involved, have moved the country away from the expected fulfillment.

For the moment this should not give rise to uncontrolled pessimism. The Central American foreign ministers as well as the UN and OAS delegations that have visited the region have agreed that 5 November is not a deadline but the beginning of the fulfillment of the agreements. Nevertheless, to avoid dashing the large majority's hopes for peace and the spirit of the peace treaty it is essential that the government eliminate the extreme formalism with which it has broached the subject until now, and the FMLN-FDR should do the same regarding the urgency with which it may have been handling the talks that have been held so far.

Undoubtedly, the zeal with which the government has tried to prove its willingness to comply with the agreements has already begun to cause more problems than benefits for Esquipulas II, with the result that instead of evoking confidence, it has caused skepticism among the insurgents. Immediately after the dialogue at the apostolic nunciature, and anticipating his own inflexibility as well as that of his opponents, President Duarte announced that regarding the cease-fire, he would eventually decree it unilaterally, impairing beforehand the possibilities of the commission created for that purpose—not to mention that the implementation of such a measure would not be more than a useless formality that is unproductive in practice. The same aforementioned dialogue was proposed by Duarte as a measure that exceeds another one of the points of the peace plan, which demands that the dialogue be held only with those sectors that have given up arms. Thus far such a measure has only proven to be more effective in its use against the Nicaraguan Government—by demanding that it adopt a similar attitude toward the contra mercenaries—than in its contribution toward favorable solutions for El Salvador.

The government's useless formalities become more dramatic when one sees the manner in which they have complied with the amnesty, which has also been presented as "a step beyond" the Esquipulas II plan. First, it is a very serious error to grant amnesty on an equal bases to the FMLN insurgents, the death squads' terrorists, or the genocidal military men, because the FMLN is a representative political force whose chiefs defend their struggle facing the people. Why do the people responsible for the death squads not identify themselves if their actions benefit the homeland? Second, it is not very honest to offer amnesty as an action to "pardon and forgive," when in fact it is also being used to conceal the incompetence and powerlessness of a judicial system that has not been able to prosecute even one of the death squad cases in the past 7 years, which is a matter that every year is regretted in the UN reports on human rights in El Salvador. This is why Duarte and his officials lie or are lying to themselves when they maintain they have dismantled the death squads and when they blame a madman or some fanatics for the killing of Herbert Anaya. Pardoning or forgiving in this manner does nothing but reopen the account of crimes perpetrated by those squads.

In this regard the government's enthusiasm for going beyond that established by Esquipulas II can easily become a trick that will lead it to failure. It is not possible to seriously negotiate with the insurgents, nor is it possible to expect that by approving an amnesty law that admits the incompetence in controlling such paramilitary gangs will lead the insurgents to give up their weapons. Such laws and such useless formalities undermine any possible success of Esquipulas II and, in general, any peace and national reconciliation process.

Guatemala

Swedish Foreign Minister Meets With Cerezo

PA091612 Guatemala City Radio-Television Guatemala in Spanish 0330 GMT 6 Nov 87

[Excerpts] Guatemalan Vice President Roberto Carpio Nicolle this morning met with Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson, who arrived yesterday. Andersson was welcomed at the airport by his Guatemalan counterpart, Alfonso Cabrera, on behalf of the government. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Andersson's activities today included a meeting with President Vinicio Cerezo, who reported on the progress toward creating a Central American parliament and on the positive developments in the area. Andersson also met with Foreign Minister Alfonso Cabrera.

Nicaragua

Borge Explains Stand on Talks With Contras

PA091947 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1200 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] Commander of the Revolution Tomas Borge Martinez reiterated last night on behalf of the FSLN National Directorate that there will never, ever be a direct or indirect political dialogue anywhere with the contra leadership. Borge made this statement during the ceremony commemorating the 11th anniversary of Commander Carlos Fonseca Amador's heroic fall and the 16th anniversary of the FSLN's creation. The ceremony was held at the Cesar Augusto Silva Convention Center.

[Begin Borge recording] In the past few hours those deprived of hope have attempted to compare the 29 October FSLN statement with the government proposal—throughly explained by our brother Daniel—for negotiating a cease-fire. There is no contradiction between the two statements.

The FSLN has said and reaffirms that it will never, ever hold a direct or indirect political dialogue with the counterrevolutionary leadership anywhere or with any mediator, because a political dialogue is not the same as agreeing on a cease-fire.

Why will we agree to a cease-fire negotiated by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo? Not only because this is established in the Esquipulas II agreements, not only because this decision had already been made on 7 August in Guatemala, where Daniel Ortega signed an agreement on behalf of Nicaragua; but because this does not violate any revolutionary principle or contradict the decision to not hold a political dialogue with the counterrevolutionaries.

I remember very well that when we made this decision we were fully aware this could be interpreted as a step backwards and could even cause some confusion. If one analyzes the content and form of all our decisions, however, one can infer that this is not a step backwards; it is a step forward. This is not a violation of principles. Instead, it reaffirms one of our most important principles, one we have never abandoned: the struggle for a prompt and lasting peace. The political dialogue and a negotiated cease-fire cannot be reduced to a dispute on semantics or to a game of synonyms. The dialogue must be understood in its essence. To sum up, there will be no political dialogue with the counterrevolution. We will faithfully comply with our pacts with history. By negotiating a cease-fire, we clearly intend to comply with the Esquipulas II agreements by keeping intact the revolutionary government's legitimate power. To the Nicaraguan people this not only means reaffirming principles but also preventing bloodshed, sorrow, and suffering.

A political dialogue seeks to question an unquestionable and legitimate power. The dialogue under the blackthorn tree [1927 agreement between Jose Moncada and U.S. envoy Henry Stimson] was a true political dialogue. The only possible political dialogue is and will be inside the country with the political parties participating in such a dialogue. Only at that forum—not elsewhere—will we hold a political dialogue. Is this clear?

A negotiated cease-fire seeks to find the mechanisms so the forces at the service of a foreign superpower, armed with borrowed rifles, will decide to join the country's life and the civilian struggle, provided their imperialist masters permit them to do so. Agreeing to a cease-fire therefore does not mean the same as a political dialogue. These are two different matters. The Esquipulas II agreements establish that to participate in the country's political life the counterrevolutionaries must first agree to the amnesty. This is a condition and a specific mandate, and unless this is complied with they will have no chance of rejoining normal life here. A negotiated cease-fire shows our determination to fulfill this commitment. The Esquipulas II agreement is not a Nicaraguan peace plan or a peace plan exclusively for Nicaragua. The Esquipulas II agreement is a peace plan for Central America. The principle of simultaneity was not created or imposed by Nicaragua. Nicaragua has the right and duty to comply with this principle. Nicaragua has the right to fulfill these commitments and the right to demand that others do so, too. We have certainly made promises, but we have certainly complied with and will comply beyond what we have promised and are obligated to fulfill. [end recording]

Presidency Sends Bills to National Assembly

State of Emergency Bill

PA070543 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 6 Nov 87 p 4

[Bill sent by the Presidency to the National Assembly]

[Text] Presidency of the Republic

The president of the Republic informs the Nicaraguan people that:

The National Assembly of the Republic of Nicaragua

Whereas

I

The signatory governments of the document entitled "Procedures To Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America" promised in Paragraph (c) of Point 5,

"Democratization," of the cited document "to abolish the state of emergency, making the de jure system effective with full constitutional guarantees";

II

Point 11 of the "Esquipulas II" document establishes that "the commitments regarding the amnesty, the cease-fire, democratization, aid to irregular forces or insurrectional movements, and the nonuse of the territory to attack other states" will go into effect simultaneously and publicly 90 days after the signing of said document;

III

On 5 November we begin the process to simultaneously comply with the commitments acquired by the Central American presidents, and the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission will have to certify the effective compliance with the agreements contained in the "Esquipulas II" agreement;

IV

Nicaragua has the firm political will to comply with the Esquipulas II agreement.

Therefore

In full use of his powers, the president decrees the following:

Law To Abolish the Emergency Decree [subhead]

Article 1. Decree No 250, "Ratification and Modification of the Suspension of Rights and Guarantees," established in the political Constitution, published in *La Gaceta*, No 56 of 10 March 1987, is abolished.

Article 2. In accordance with the principle of simultaneity, which is essential to the agreements contained in the document "Procedures To Establish Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America," the restoration of constitutional guarantees will be effective and will be implemented at the moment in which the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission, created in the document, once the corresponding in situ confirmations have been implemented, certifies the fulfillment of:

1. The commitments made by the Central American governments to "prevent the use of their territory, and of not lending or allowing military logistic support to people, organizations, or groups attempting to destabilize" the Nicaraguan Government.

2. An end to the "aid in military, logistical, financial, propaganda, personnel, weapons, ammunition, and equipment support" to the counterrevolutionaries armed against the Nicaraguan Government and people.

Article 3. This law shall become effective on the date the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission issues the confirmation referred to in the previous article.

Article 4. The present law shall be published in *La Gaceta*, the official newspaper.

Given in the city of Managua on the day of the month of of 1987. [published without day or month specified]

Daniel Ortega Saavedra

President of the Republic

Amnesty Bill

PA070619 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 6 Nov 87 p 4

[Bill sent by the Presidency to the National Assembly]

[Text]

The President of the Republic informs the Nicaraguan people that:

The National Assembly of the Republic of Nicaragua

Whereas:

I

The Central American presidents, at a meeting in Guatemala City on 6 and 7 August 1987, signed the document entitled "Procedures To Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America;"

II

Paragraph 1 of that document, entitled "National Reconciliation," stipulates that the Central American governments shall issue amnesty decrees "that will guarantee the inviolability of life, freedom in all its forms, material possessions, and personal security;"

III

The "International Verification and Follow-Up Commission" will be the one to certify compliance with the Esquipulas II commitments.

Therefore, using its powers, the National Assembly decrees the following amnesty law:

Article 1. Amnesty is hereby granted to all Nicaraguan citizens who, at the date this law becomes effective, are under the custody of the state's security organizations, the Attorney General's Office, the common courts, or the

People's Anti-Somozist Courts, or who have been convicted by the aforementioned courts for the violation of the Law on the Maintenance of Order and Public Security and other related crimes, dated 20 July 1979, and its amendments.

Article 2. Those Nicaraguan citizens included in Article 1 who have been convicted for espionage contemplated in clause (b) of Article 1 of Decree No 1074 or Article 537 of the Penal Code are excluded from the benefits of this law.

Article 3. In agreement with the essential principle of simultaneity contained in the "Procedures To Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America," this amnesty shall become effective on the date when the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission, created in the aforementioned document, certifies the compliance of:

1. The commitments made by the Central American governments to "prevent the use of their territory, and not lending or allowing military logistical support to people, organizations, or groups attempting to destabilize" the Nicaraguan Government.

2. An end to the "military, logistical, financial, propaganda, personnel, weapons, ammunition, and equipment support" to the counterrevolutionaries armed against the Nicaraguan Government and people.

Article 4. This law shall become effective on the date the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission, once it has made the corresponding verifications in situ, issues the certification referred to in the previous article. Only at that moment shall the authorities proceed to release those covered by the present amnesty.

Article 5. The present law shall be published in *La Gaceta*, the official newspaper.

Issued in Managua on the day of the month of 1987. [published without day or month specified]

Daniel Ortega Saavedra

President

Pardon Bill

PA070600 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 6 Nov 87 p 4

[Bill sent by the Presidency to the National Assembly; boldface as published]

[Text] Presidency of the Republic

The president of the Republic

hereby reports to the Nicaraguan people that:

The National Assembly of the Republic of Nicaragua

Considering

I

That within the framework of the Esquipulas Agreement signed on 7 August 1987 by the Central American presidents the Nicaraguan Government has adopted important unilateral measures, even before the termination of the deadlines established in the aforementioned agreement, with the purpose of demonstrating its firm determination to contribute to the regional peace effort;

II

That the U.S. Government and its mercenary troops have responded to this clear desire for peace by reaffirming their desire for aggression and death;

III

That since the process of simultaneous compliance with the commitments made by the Central American presidents begins on 5 November the Nicaraguan Government has issued an amnesty decree that will be implemented according to the letter and spirit of Esquipulas II, and based on simultaneity;

IV

That, nevertheless, as another act of good will, and while the amnesty decree goes into effect, the Nicaraguan Government deems it convenient to grant a pardon to 981 people who have been sentenced or prosecuted for actions made in violation of public order and public security and for perpetrating crimes of an international nature.

Therefore, in using his powers he decrees

The following pardon law:

Article 1. Pardon shall be granted to:

a)

(The list of 981 people is included.) [sentence as published]

Article 2. The authorities will enforce this law and should release those who will benefit from this decree once it goes into effect.

Article 3. This decree will go into effect once it has been published in *La Gaceta*, the official newspaper.

Issued in the City of Managua on 5 November 1987

Daniel Ortega Saavedra

President

Contras on Esquipulas Plan Compliance
PA082020 Tegucigalpa LA TRIBUNA in Spanish 6 Nov 87 p 35

[Paid advertisement: Communique issued by the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) Board of Directors "to the Nicaraguan people and the international community"; dated 5 November]

[Text] The Nicaraguan conflict, which affects the entire Central American region, originates in internal factors brought about by the Sandinist regime's escalated process of repression and denial of civilian rights by its totalitarian and expansionist nature.

The freedom fighters' armed struggle is the people's legitimate instrument to deal with a dictatorial regime, which is kept in power against the will of most Nicaraguans.

The Nicaraguan Resistance, which did not sign the Esquipulas II peace plan, backed it firmly and clearly since the very day it was signed. The RN accepted President Duarte's 15 September proposal for a dialogue with the Sandinists, designated a commission to negotiate the cease-fire, and delivered 80 prisoners of war to the Costa Rican Government. In October, the RN leadership expressed the desire to travel to Managua to arrange for a cease-fire and accepted Cardinal Miguel Obando Bravo as mediator for a dialogue between the RN and the Sandinist regime.

Firm and lasting peace can be attained only if the Sandinist regime fully complies with Esquipulas II, the established schedule, and President Ortega's own 12 July 1979 pledge to the OAS.

For genuine democratization, the RN regards as fundamental the separation between the state, the party, and the Army, the union of which serves as the basis for the Sandinist totalitarian system. Also, for the national reconciliation agreed upon by Esquipulas II a general amnesty should be decreed, the state of emergency abolished, and a top-level dialogue with the RN initiated.

The armed struggle will cease if the Sandinist regime admits that the main confrontation in this conflict occurs between the people who aspire to genuine democracy and the totalitarian regime, which has brought desolation and death to Nicaragua and destabilization to Central America.

The RN will continue to make every effort to achieve peace, but never at the cost of Nicaraguans' freedom.

5 November 1987

Nicaraguan Resistance Board of Directors

Adolfo Calero, Alfredo Cesar, Pedro J. Chamorro, Azucena Ferrey, Alfonso Robelo, Aristides Sanchez

RN on Plan Support, Government Noncompliance
PA061700 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 5 Nov 87 p 33

[Paid advertisement by the Nicaraguan Resistence (RN)]

[Text] THE RN DID NOT SIGN THE ESQUIPULAS II AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, IT HAS EFFECTIVELY ACCEPTED IT AND SUPPORTED IT, AS CAN BE SEEN IN THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

The RN has repeatedly stated in an official manner its commitment to talks with the Sandinist regime to reach an agreement on a cease-fire in Nicaragua.

The RN has announced its willingness to travel to Nicaragua in order to begin a dialogue needed to bring peace to the country and truly abide by the peace plan.

The RN has appointed a top-level commission to agree on the cease-fire as a sign of its goodwill toward the Esquipulas II agreement.

The RN has released 80 prisoners of war in compliance with its stance of contributing to national reconciliation, as the Esquipulas agreement states.

The RN has forsaken lethal aid as an unmistaken sign of its effective support of the peace plan.

The RN made a pledge to the democratic presidents of Central America to support the Esquipulas II agreement and has kept its pledge, as the stated facts indicate.

THE SANDINIST REGIME DID SIGN THE PEACE PLAN, BUT DID NOT TRULY ACCEPT OR ABIDE BY IT, AS THE FOLLOWING FACTS INDICATE:

It has categorically refused to reach a cease-fire with the RN and has continued to announce far-reaching military campaigns and to bomb civilian areas.

It has denied visas and documents to RN members and forbidden airlines to transport these people to Managua, thereby rejecting a dialogue proposed by the Central American presidents.

It officially refuses to grant broad amnesty to over 8,000 political prisoners in Nicaragua, contravening the Esquipulas II agreement.

It continues arming itself and fanning the war, as can be seen in the massive military recruitment of Nicaraguan youths.

It has manipulated and encouraged the failure of the domestic dialogue contemplated in Esquipulas II by arbitrarily choosing the participants and imposing the issues to be discussed in the dialogue.

It has stated that it will not lift the state of emergency in Nicaragua, in flagrant violation of the Esquipulas II agreement.

The Sandinist regime has voided by deed and words the Esquipulas II agreement and has only proven that it seeks to use that agreement to dismantle the RN and consolidate totalitarianism in Central America.

Throughout the 90-day period (7 August to 5 November 1987), the Sandinist regime has shown no commitment to abide by the agreement, which is only consistent with its totalitarian objectives.

THE SANDINIST FRONT HAS STATED: "...NO WAY, NOWHERE, THROUGH NO MEDIATOR WILL THERE EVER BE A POLITICAL DIALOGUE EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY..."

(Statement by the FSLN National Directorate in Managua, 29 October 1987)

The RN

Panama

Liberal Delegates Request Special Session

PA091259 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2300 GMT 6 Nov 87

[Letter to Liberal Party President Roderick Esquivel from Liberal Party delegates; dated 5 November]

[Text] Panama City, 5 November 1987

Mr Roderick Esquivel

President, Liberal Party

Panama City

Mr President:

Based on Article 16 of the Liberal Party statutes, the undersigned party delegates request that you call the national convention to a special session.

We request that the special session of the Liberal Party national convention be held on 29 November 1987, at 0900, in the ARO Theater of Penonome, Cocle Province, to:

1. Abolish agreements and resolutions concerning the Liberal Party's National Democratic Union alliance adopted by lower-level party organs, because these decisions can only be made at the national convention level, and abolish the Discipline Tribunal's resolutions concerning the explulsion of some party members.

2. Appoint new Executive Committee members, National Directorate members and alternates, National Political Directorate members, Discipline Tribunal members, Consultative Board members, and a new comptroller.

3. Whatever the delegates propose.

Respectfully yours,

[List of 162 signatures, led by Rodolfo Chiari De Leon, Alberto Arango, and Targidio A. Bernal]

50 U.S. Canal Treaty 'Violations' Listed

PA092110 Panama City LA REPUBLICA DOMINICAL in Spanish 8 Nov 87 p 11-B

[Article by Luis Restrepo Rosas: "50 Violations of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] For the purpose of analysis, U.S. violations of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties can be divided into groups according to the objectives of the violations and infringements.

Some of the violations emanate from the enforcement of Public Law 96-70 of the U.S. Congress concerning the treaty's application. Other violations are committed directly by U.S. Government officials. [passage omitted]

VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATIES [subhead]

1. Establishing the Panama Canal Commission within the executive branch, under the direction and direct authority of the U.S. President, who exercises this authority through the Secretary of Defense, even though the treaty clearly provides that the commission will be under the direction and authority of a board of directors in which four Panamanians will participate.

2. Reducing the managerial function of the board to a mere supervisory function.

3. Subjecting the bylaws of the Board of Directors to approval by the secretary of state.

4. Creating the position of chief engineer, not provided for in the treaty, whose functions are determined by the President and can be the same as those which the U.S. administrator currently performs.

5. Curtailing the authority of the Consultative Committee, reducing it to a simple diplomatic forum.

6. Discriminating against the Panamanian representatives on the Board of Directors and the Joint Commission on the Environment with regard to the payment of travel expenses and per diem.

7. Granting the [U.S.] ambassador an authority that was not agreed to in the treaty with regard to coordination of the transfer to Panama of functions that Panama must assume under the treaty.

8. Subjecting Panamanian Commission employees to U.S. labor laws, even though the treaty provides that the employment terms and conditions of those employees will be approved by the Commission's Board of Directors and will therefore be local ones.

9. Subjecting Commission employees to a competitive system, disregarding the mandate contained in the treaty with regard to a growing participation of Panamanians in employment.

10. Allowing the canal administrator or the deputy canal administrator to be an active member of the U.S. military services.

11. Creating a subsidy system for the benefit of U.S. officials and employees, which is not provided for in the treaty.

12. Granting eligibility preferences to U.S. war veterans, ignoring the principle of eligibility preference for Panamanians provided for in the treaty.

13. Not observing days off and national holidays established by Panamanian law and instead the observance of U.S. holidays.

14. Charging to Commission operating costs payments toward early retirement for services rendered to the now defunct Panama Canal Co. and to the former Canal Zone.

15. Charging to Commission operating costs of aid to Panama Canal employees not covered by the Canal Zone retirement law.

16. Charging to Commission operating costs covering artificial limbs or other devices for those injured while working for the Panama Canal Co.

17. Creating a Personnel Policy Coordinating Board in which no Panamanian takes part, that does not answer to the Board of Directors, and that is not part of the treaty.

18. Applying Title 5 of the U.S. Labor Code to Commission labor relations, leaving Panamanian employees subject to the U.S. secretary of labor and to the Federal Labor Relations Board.

19. Placing under Congress' administration nonappropiated Commission funds. The Commission cannot earmark any funds whatsoever unless this fund assignment has been specifically authorized or assigned by law.

20. Limiting U.S. financial responsibility in the canal by saying that funds for the Commission will not be assigned in excess of the income generated by the canal in any fiscal year.

21. The U.S. Treasury's refusing to create a Panama Canal fund to face emergencies like the recent Gold Hill landslide.

22. Using accounting practices beyond the 1950 Accounting and Audit Law which are not compatible with generally accepted accounting norms and practices.

23. Classifying capital investments as operating costs.

24. Charging to operating costs the depreciation of equipment and machinery that were the property of the former Panama Canal Co. and which the Commission received through transfer or nonliable title.

25. Excluding Panama from the audit that determines the surplus to which Panama has a right to by treaty.

26. Charging to canal operating costs the public services to zonian [preceding word in English] U.S. citizen employees such as education and health.

27. Extending the use of the embassy diplomatic pouch for personal correspondence of canal zonian employee personnel and charging this service as a Commission operating cost.

28. Charging to Commission operating costs the losses of previous fiscal years, thus affecting the surplus that should be paid to Panama according to the results of each fiscal period.

29. Prohibiting the establishment of tolls at a rate [high enough] to permit paying the surplus amount to Panama. Such a practice is not prohibited by the treaty.

30. Limiting the Commission's responsibility for damage or loss resulting from canal operations up to $50,000 and, based on this, the refusal to pay the Port Authority damages in the ports exceeding that amount.

31. Creating a U.S. investigation court in Panama named the Board of Local Inspectors where witnesses are summoned, oaths are taken, books and documents are demanded, and other jurisdictional proceedings are conducted.

32. Reverting to the United States all the property and assets the Panama Canal Commission had on the date the treaty entered into force and granting to the commission only the right of use. Through this measure the

United States has been freely transferring land and assets of the canal to other U.S. agencies and will transfer all the movable equipment and property to other U.S. agencies when the treaty expires.

33. Placing under the authority of the U.S. President and not the Board of Directors the establishment of and from time to time the change in the tolls and the regulations for ship tonnage.

34. Prohibiting the establishment of tolls at levels estimated to produce sufficient revenue to cover the surplus payments stipulated in the treaty.

35. Charging the Commission for the interest "on the U.S. investments in the Panama Canal" and unilaterally using an arbitrary formula to charge interest.

36. Submitting the change of the canal water regulations to a judicial meeting in accordance with Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code.

37. Conferring on the U.S. President the authority to issue regulations of a municipal and police nature to be applied in Panama, such as the exclusion and removal of people, the possession and use of alcoholic beverages, health and sanitation regulations, protection and custody of animals, the sale or use of fireworks, protection of fauna, fishing and hunting, and the granting of official licenses to seamen of the vessels that sail on the waters of the canal and its adjacent areas, including Balboa and Cristobal ports.

38. Appointing a [U.S.] economist after qualified Panamanians had applied for the position.

39. Refusing to fly the Panamanian flag on Commission vessels operating in Panamanian jurisdictional waters and instead using an illegal flag [bandera pirata].

40. Maintaining U.S. citizens after their retirement in positions for which there are better qualified Panamanians.

41. Granting "zonians" the privilege of making purchases in the military stores and using the U.S. Army post offices in Panama without any agreement being reached in the Joint Committee.

42. Refusing to withhold income tax from third country nationals who work in the canal.

43. Refusing to cooperate with the Panamanian authorities as stipulated in the treaty in deducting from salaries of Commission employees the child support and debt payment established by the proper Panamanian courts.

44. Establishing mechanisms to eliminate positions left open by the departure of U.S. employees so as to not employ qualified Panamanians, such as in the case of the Engineering and Construction Bureau.

45. Maintaining subsidy rates for U.S. employees in the leasing of homes and the use of electricity, water, education, and hospitalization, subsidies which are not authorized in the treaty.

46. Charging to canal operating costs salaries of domestic employees at the service of the Commission administrator, expenses which are not authorized in the treaty.

47. Maintaining illegal replacement policies during the temporary absence of employees, even when there are qualified Panamanians, always preferring U.S. employees even if they are unqualified.

48. Refusing to employ Panamanians in the Commission office in the United States, which is in violation of the treaty.

49. Administering the Commission from Washington, surpassing the authority of the administration. [sentence as published]

50. Creating a special police corps that bears arms and is uniformed, an act of provocation against the Panamanian police, which are charged by the Constitution and the treaty to provide this protection. This is an act meant to provoke violence.

Argentina

Economic Official Says State 'Virtually Broke'

PY091410 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 1218 GMT 8 Nov 87

[Text] Mar del Plata, 8 Nov (DYN)—Economic Coordination Secretary Adolfo Canitrot has said that "the state is virtually broke," adding that the only solution would be "a major reform" including the opening of the market and the "reduction" of state-run enterprises.

After pointing out that the state is broke, he said conditions are not ripe for "simultaneously promoting capital growth and social justice."

In a speech that Canitrot delivered during the 23d conference of the Idea Organization, he said "the state is overburdened and subject to excessive demands."

Canitrot said the "main reform" that the Argentine economy needs is based on "a reduction of the participation of the state in the productive sector, in other words, the promotion of domestic and foreign investment in areas that so far have been reserved for the state."

He added that another foundation of the reform is "the opening of the economy to promote demand, competition, and efficiency."

He said the state must "return to its basic functions: justice; defense; security; protection of the environment; preservation of social justice; and the promotion of health, housing, education, and social programs."

He warned, however, that "the path that has been proposed (by the economic team) is different from the one we advocate, and the longer we take to adopt it, the harder it will be for us to find a solution."

Canitrot explained that the economic plan of the Radical government "assumes that the rules of the game that it has established will remain unchanged, because otherwise the private investments that are necessary to guarantee its success will not be forthcoming."

He added: "The desire to find our own place in the world, to reform the state, [words indistinct] depend on any government officials; they are a task to be undertaken by the entire governemnt."

[Words indistinct] that the program has an all-encompassing scope. This means it seeks to curb inflation, and at the same time solve the problem of stagnation."

He stated: "This plan to solve two problems simultaneously is based on an evaluation according to which the short-term problems—inflation in particular—are the main consequences of an exhausted model of growth, the inertial drive of which has generated imbalances."

He then stressed that "the state is virtually broke and, consequently, it cannot simultaneously promote capital growth and social justice, in addition to meeting the foreign debt obligations."

"The remedy to this situation can be nothing less than a major economic reform that should promote economic growth, but with foundations other than those that were used in the past," he said.

Central Bank President Rules Out Moratorium

PY100214 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1915 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 9 Nov (TELAM)—Central Bank President Jose Luis Machinea has made it clear that Argentina has no intention of declaring a moratorium on its foreign debt. He stated that Argentina seeks to negotiate with, not confront, its creditors.

Machinea made these remarks at the end of a luncheon with the main leaders of the Buenos Aires Chamber of Commerce.

Army Chief Caridi To Announce Promotions

PY090204 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 0654 GMT 8 Nov 87

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 8 Nov (DYN)—According to military sources, Army Chief of Staff General Jose Caridi will preside over a meeting with high-ranking officers of the force this week to announce a complete list of Army promotions.

The meeting is part of the regularly scheduled meetings that Army generals and colonels hold every 2 months. This meeting, however, is more important because of the uneasiness within the ranks steming from a troop review carried out jointly by Caridi and retired former Army Chief Gen Hector Rios Erenu. [passage omitted]

Brazil

Bresser Views Reestablishment of Moratorium

PY101421 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 10 Nov 87

[Text] If by 10 November, Brazil has not reached an agreement for the renegotiation of the debt with creditor banks, the moratorium will be reestablished. Finance Minister Bresser Pereira made this statement after a meeting with PMDB President Ulysses Guimaraes and other party leaders. Bresser said the PMDB supports the debt renegotiation.

[Begin Bresser recording] I think the PMDB supports the debt renegotiation. The party as a whole is supporting the debt renegotiation, as well as the following objectives: that we guarantee Brazil's economic development, and that this development be achieved by ourselves in accordance with our possibilities, with no detriment to

the Brazilian people. This is being achieved. Now, the alternative to the type of agreement we want is confrontation. But we do not want this. We are going to try to avoid confrontation, although we want to make it very clear to our creditors that we will negotiate only if we can achieve significant progress in relation to the agreements achieved by Mexico and Argentina. We have already managed to break away from the IMF, but we also want a ceiling on interest rates; a renegotiation schedule, which has already been achieved; and a bond issue for which we need the banks' authorization to issue long-term bonds with fixed and lower interest rates. Without these points we will not sign a final agreement. We fear that this could be understood as a confrontation, but it is not. What we want to show is that we are honestly willing to negotiate. The creditors are doing the same. [end recording]

Frota Netto Denies Report on Direct Elections
PY100119 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] President Jose Sarney is not thinking of calling direct elections in 1988 said Presidential Secretary Frota Netto. Netto described the press reports published to this effect as mere speculation.

According to Frota Netto, President Sarney is keeping his well-known stance; that is, a 5-year presidential term and a presidential system.

[Begin Frota Netto recording, in progress]...President Sarney's position of keeping his well-known (?stance).

New facts or variables have not caused him to change his position because his opinion is not just a subjective opposition, but the result of the president's reflection concerning the country's institutional needs. [end recording]

Frota Netto said that President Sarney still intends to struggle, work, and negotiate for the current government system and that is why Sarney himself accepted a reduced term for his time in office.

Nevertheless, Frota Netto recalled that, as a politician, President Sarney will accept any decision made by the Constituent Assembly.

PMDB Satisfied With Preliminary Agreement
PY092028 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 1500 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] Finance Minister Bresser Pereira has met with PMDB leaders to explain the preliminary foreign debt agreement that was reached this past week. The meeting was held at the finance minister's residence in Brasilia. The PMDB leaders came to the meeting seeking official explanations about that agreement. The party objected to two points in that preliminary agreement; namely, the fact that Brazil has to reach an agreement with the IMF and that the moratorium is to be suspended. After a 2 and 1/2 hour meeting, the doors were opened to photographers and television cameramen. Attending the meeting were the main Brazilian debt negotiator Fernao Bracher, Central Bank President Fernando Milliet, and the PMDB leaders en masse, led by Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes. The result of the talks was satisfactory for both the govenrment economic team and the PMDB politicians.

[Begin recording] [Guimaraes] The PMDB understands that the explanation that the minister made on two fundamental points, that is, the moratorium was in fact suspended so that the negotiations on the debt can proceed with the banks, and secondly, the possible return to the IMF cannot influence these negotiations. These negotiations, therefore, seem reasonable.

[Bresser Pereira] We are all from the same party and we all have the same objectives, fundamentally to negotiate the foreign debt and to guarantee Brazil's economic growth. We will try by all means to avoid confrontations, but we will also make it clear to our creditors that we will only conclude negotiations if a significant improvement can be made compared to the agreements that were closed with Mexico and Argentina. [end recording]

Polls Show Some Favor Return of Military
PY092149 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 8 Nov 87 P 6

[Excerpt] Almost one-third of the Sao Paulo population favors the return of the military to power according to the results of three polls carried out by Datafolha during the months of October and November. The rate of support to a new military goverment varies according to the alternatives offered to the persons questioned in the three polls. The following were the alternatives offered and the answers given:

Poll No 1: 38 percent of the people said they were in favor of a new military government when they were asked just to say whether they were for or against the return to power of the Armed Forces.

Poll No 2: 31 percent of the people of Sao Paulo said that they were in favor of the return of the military when asked whether it was best for the country to interrupt the transition to democracy or for the Armed Forces to return to government.

Poll No 3: 18 percent of the Sao Paulo inhabitants want a military government if they were offered the alternative of continuing the political transition, speeding it up by calling presidential elections in 1988, or of a new military intervention in the country's leadership.

As a consequence, the results reveal that the choice for the return of the military is conditioned by the political alternatives of the poll. The results also reveal the people's great lack of satisfaction with President Jose

Sarney's goverment and a generalized desire for a change among the inhabitants of Sao Paulo. However, the results show that a sector of the population (18 percent) support a military goverment under any circumstances and that 38 percent are in favor of the Armed Forces' interfering in politics. This 38 percent of the population does not seem to be worried about whether or not it is legitimate for the Armed Forces to interfere in politics. This sector of the population believes that a military government would have the same "status" as others that come to power through the rules which the population and politicians know and acknowledge.

On the other hand, the results of the polls carried out by Datafolha show that 62 percent of the Sao Paulo population believe that the best solution to the current Brazilian political situation is the holding of direct presidential elections.[passage omitted]

Bresser Takes Action on Illegal Car Price Hike
PY062259 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 6 Nov 87

[Excerpts] The Finance Ministry has decided to adopt administrative measures and legal action against the Autolatina holding [preceding word in English] company. This information is included in an official note that the ministry released today.

The note advises consumers not to pay the increased prices the company set for its vehicles, adding that the decision by the manufacturer is illegal and harmful for the economy and for consumers, and that the manufacturer has ignored the interests of the community because it has ignored the time the country is going through. [passage omitted]

Finance Minister Luis Bresser today instructed Central Bank President Fernando Milliet to end all discount, transfer, and refinancing operations involving Autolatina. The minister instructed Bank of Brazil President Camilo Calazans to cut all credits to Autolatina and its subsidiaries. The minister asked Sao Paulo Governor Orestes Quercia to adopt immediate measures to prevent Autolatina from selling its products at prices above the level established by the government.

July International Reserves Position Revealed
PY071630 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Nov 87 p A 25

[Text] Yesterday in Brasilia, the Central Bank announced the country's international reserves position as of July. Measured in available cash, as the Brazilian Government has done since Dilson Funaro's tenure as finance minister, Brazil ended July with $3.77 billion in foreign reserves in actual cash. Measured from the standpoint of the IMF concept of liquidity, which applies to reserves in cash, gold, SDR, debt notes receivable, and nonmonetary resources, international reserves stood at $6,474,000,000 in July.

The cash growth of $514 million and the liquidity rise of $844 million in July over June can be attributed, according to Central Bank experts, to two factors. One is that June was an unusual month in which payments to official credit agencies (IMF, IBRD, Paris Club, etc) were concentrated, thus there was a drop in reserves compared with May. The second factor is that for the first time since the implementation of the Bresser Plan, the growth of Brazilian exports was reflected in the growth of foreign reserves.

Still, continuous remittances abroad, which have not stopped increasing since the second half of 1986, are preventing the country's trade balance surplus (exports minus imports) from being fully reflected in the country's foreign reserves accumulation.

Influence of Former President Geisel Discussed
PY031124 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 1 Nov 87 p A 6

[By Rio de Janeiro correspondent Neri Vitor]

[Excerpts]More than 13 years after he announced on 29 August 1974, as the nation's president, the "slow, gradual, and firm policy of liberalization," General Ernesto Geisel continues to exert influence on politicians, military men, and businessmen. These people contact Geisel daily at his office in the Northeast Chemical Corporation (Norquisa) on President Vargas Avenue in Rio de Janeiro. Geisel is currently president of Norquisa. Determined to avoid disruptions of the democratic transition process that began under his government, Geisel not only staved off last week's PFL break with the government, but a month ago persuaded a group of military men not to carry out a movement to destabilize the Sarney government.

In mid-September he was sought out by a group of reserve colonels who consulted him about the viability of the plot. Geisel argued that the idea did not interest the Armed Forces, and that the only way to avoid a social upheaval is to support President Sarney and the transition process, which, the former president believes, will end once the new constitution is promulgated. Former Justice Minister Armando Falcao, a close friend of former President Geisel, said last Friday that the report on the colonel's plot "was imagined" by those who provided the information to *Folha de Sao Paulo*. Former Minister Falcao attended a Brazilian Association for the Defense of Democracy [ABDD] meeting at the old Aeronautics Club (downtown Rio de Janeiro) on 7 October. The ABDD is a group of so-called hard-line military members. [passage omitted] In the political area, Geisel's influence can be noticed among congressmen and ministers, mainly of the PFL. Senator Marco Maciel, PFL president, is a frequent visitor at Geisel's office. In October, Maciel visited the office twice. Maciel

also talks by phone almost daily with the former president who, during his goverment, made Maciel chairman of the Chamber of Deputies and later Pernambuco State governor.

Although Communications Minister Antonio Carlos Magalhaes has not visited Geisel's office at Norquisa, he is another PFL politician who frequently talks with the former president by phone. Since he thinks former Rio de Janeiro Governor Leonel Brizola continues to be a strong presidential candidate, Geisel is defending a 5-year office term for President Sarney. He also worries about PFL leaders eager to throw Mines and Energy Minister Aureliano Chaves' hat into the presidential ring. Aureliano Chaves himself visited the former president late in September and again 2 weeks ago. [passage omitted]

Other politicians who are in frequent contact with General Ernesto Geisel, either personally or by phone, are Senator Guilherme Pereira (PFL Alagoas); Deputy Prisco Viana (PMDB-Bahia State), who was a pro-Paulo Maluf member pf the PDS [Social Democratic Party] and is now the Urban Development Minister; and former labor minister and current federal Deputy Arnaldo Prieto (PFL-Rio Grande do Sul State).

Of the Geisel brothers, Ernesto, Henrique, and the late Orlando, the latter used to have the most influence in the military area. However, the former president, on account of the positions he held and his well-recognized strategic vision, is much respected among his friends and old colleagues in uniform. His opinions are heeded by current Army Minister General Leonidas Pires Goncalves, and SNI Chief General Ivan de Souza Mendes. Both Pires Goncalves and Souza Mendes worked with Geisel in the military cabinet of President Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1964-67). [passage omitted]

Swedish Industry Minister Visits, Views Debt

PY090115 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] Visiting Swedish Industry Minister Thage Peterson said creditor countries are also responsible for their loans to Third World nations and must taken their share of responsibility during negotiations to solve the problem.

Peterson added that Sweden will not turn its back on Brazil in times of trouble.

Chile

PDC President, Others Discuss Plebiscite Date

PY072332 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1648 GMT 7 Nov 87

[Text] Santiago, 7 Nov (EFE)—Christian Democratic Party [PDC] President Patricio Aylwin, a former senator, today said that the possibility of moving up the date of the plebiscite for the citizenry to decide on the next president of the Republic can only be explained as "an expression of General Pinochet's nervousness."

According to the current Chilean Constitution, which went into force in 1981, the Armed Forces must select their presidential candidate for the 1989-97 term through a plebiscite. Direct elections would then be held in 1990 only in the event that the majority of citizens vote against the proposed candidate.

Although political circles believed the plebiscite would probably be held in September 1988, General Pinochet said, 3 days ago, that the plebiscite could be held any day, any month.

In comments to the press in Santiago, sources close to the government have said that the possibility of moving up the plebiscite to March, April, or May 1988 is being studied.

In this regard, Aylwin said that the government is aware of the fact that their only possibility of winning the plebiscite is to hold a "sort of tricky" ["medio tramposo"] plebiscite before the majority of the 8 million Chileans entitled to vote have registered.

The PDC president added that under these conditions such a plebiscite would not be recognized as legitimate by the opposition, which, under such circumstances, would not participate in the plebiscite.

Aylwin reiterated that the opposition continues to work for free elections, trying to implement a constitutional reform that will turn the plebiscite into a direct electoral contest, adding that if the only possibility is the plebiscite, "we should first decide whether we will participate."

"Obviously, if we participate it will be to say no to Gen Pinochet or to any candidate who will continue with the regime."

Junta Member Matthei Cited

PY091603 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1743 GMT 8 Nov 87

[Text] Santiago, 8 Nov (TELAM)—Chilean Air Force Commander General Fernando Matthei has asserted that the plebiscite regarding the military Government Junta's sole candidate cannot be held for 10 or 11 months, and that there is no campaign to move the plebiscite date forward.

The Chilean Junta member thus referred to the recent developments regarding the plebiscite and to unofficial announcements, linked to government sources, that the plebiscite date would be moved forward to early 1988.

Matthei said the Armed Forces are not going to perpetrate a fraud. He said the steps established by the current Constitution will be followed and there are no disagreements among the members of the Junta on this subject.

It should be pointed out that the opposition reacted to announcements last week of the possibility of the plebiscite date being moved forward by stating that if this happened, it would represent a fraud, and by demanding measures to prevent it from happening.

Asked about the possibility [of moving the plebiscite date forward], military Junta president Admiral Jose Toribio Merino dismissed the possibility and [words indistinct] 1988.

Matthei said: There has been no request to move the date forward, and it is not up to me to make this request. Chileans have quite enough time ahead of them before the plebiscite date; at least 10 or 11 months. A lot can happen in 10 or 11 months, and we are not engaged in a campaign to move the date forward.

Matthei reiterated his criticism of the political parties by stating that he had hoped they would come up with some constructive idea, some big idea, on how to improve the country's future, but instead all they do is engage in petty lobbying and small-group discussions on whether or not they will unite, and this is not good for the country.

Matthei ended by stating: The country needs political parties. They are necessary for the future, for congress, but it makes me sad to see that they have not been able to define themselves.

Merino Comments Noted

PY092102 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Relay from Punta Arenas by Rodrigo Araya]

[Text] Admiral Jose Toribio Merino, Navy commander and member of the Government Junta, today said in this city that no plebiscite will be held before 11 September 1988 because the Government Junta will not officially proclaim a candidate before that date.

Merino pointed out that the Junta members will meet before 11 September 1988 and will choose a candidate but no official announcement will be made at that time; therefore, the plebiscite will have to be held between 11 September 1988 and 60 days after 12 December 1988, which is the last deadline established by the Constitution. [recorded passage indistinct]

Merino added that Chileans who live abroad and who want to participate in the plebiscite must come to Chile to register in the electoral registries and then return again to vote because there is not enough time to implement legislation to allow them to vote in Chilean consulates. He said that this is very difficult to do, that it takes a long time, and that we are running out of time.

He also said that the Government Junta is not going to review the supplementary law of Article 8 despite the many complaints against it. Merino said that the law is there and without Article 8 it would have no meaning. He also pointed out that the law does not restrict freedom of the press or restrict any freedom, as reported by some union organizations. Admiral Merino is spending 1 week in Punta Arenas to visit the installations of the 3d Naval Zone.

Survey on Prospective Presidential Candidates

PY090215 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1730 GMT 8 Nov 87

[Text] According to a survey disclosed by publicity agent Jaime Celedon today, General Augusto Pinochet would only receive 18.8 percent of the votes if he were the official candidate for the Chilean presidential plebiscite.

During a regular Sunday radio program, Celedon said that he was authorized to give details of the survey conducted by the publishing agency "Portada." This agency publishes the independent-right magazine *Que Pasa*.

According to Celedon, if Pinochet were the candidate, 18.8 percent of the people would vote yes, 66.3 percent would vote no, and 14.8 percent declined to answer.

According to the 1981 Constitution promulgated by Pinochet, the Armed Forces will propose a candidate for president for the 1989-97 term and will submit him to a plebiscite. Only if the majority of Chileans vote no on this candidate will there be a direct election in 1990.

Celedon said that according to the survey, 22.1 percent would favor former Interior Minister Sergio Jarpa if he were the candidate.

The survey showed a high percentage of yes votes only when those questioned, a total of 200 persons, were asked if they would vote for Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, son of the former Christian Democrat President Eduardo Frei Montalva, if he were a candidate.

According to the survey, 45.6 percent would vote yes for Frei Ruiz-Tagle, 28.6 percent would vote no, and 25.8 percent did not answer.

Paraguay

Music Festival Suspended 'on Orders From Above'

PY091427 Asuncion HOY in Spanish 8 Nov 87 p 6

[Text] On the evening of 6 November, Alto Parana government forces prohibited the "Paraguay Lives" music festival, sponsored by the Ciudad President Stroessner university student center, from being held.

The festival was to be held at the social hall of the second residential sector [of the Itaipu Hydroelectric Plant Project], but the government forces cordoned off the entire block several hours before the festival, thus closing the area to the public and to the performers. The measure was justified on the grounds that there was an "order from above," according to information supplied by the student center. The student center reported that the festival was to have featured well-known performers from Asuncion and Alto Parana, of the so-called "new-wave" style, and that the festival, which was a competition, was scheduled to continue on 7 November.

Febrerista President in Satisfactory Condition

PY091429 Asuncion HOY in Spanish 8 Nov 87 p 7

[Text] Febrerista Revolutionary Party [PRF] official spokesman Dr Cesar Baez Samaniego has said "the information supplied by acting PRF vice president Oscar Acuna Torres on the condition of party president Dr Fernando Vera is inaccurate and uncertain, because Dr Vera's condition is neither desperate nor serious."

Baez Samaniego reiterated that Vera's life "was never in danger and he is satisfactorily recuperating," adding that he talked over the phone with the PRF president's wife, Celsa Gonzalez de Vera, who said the operation her husband underwent at a hospital in Washington was performed normally and that "at no time was his life in danger. He underwent prostate surgery and a general checkup."

Colorado Faction Unable To Launch Campaign

PY091419 Asuncion ULTIMA HORA in Spanish 7 Nov 87 p 9

[Excerpt] The Colorado Party Ethical and Doctrinary Movement last night was unable to launch a campaign to cast blank votes.

The movement was to have held a meeting at the Radio Nanduti "Jancinto Herrera" theater, which was cordoned of by police, who thus prevented the public from reaching the theater.

Ethical and Doctrinary Movement leader engineer Carlos Romero Arza was scheduled to deliver a speech and explain the reasons for the campaign and the methodology that was to be followed. The campaign was to be officially launched during the meeting.

The people who went to the theater to attend the meeting were stopped by the police.

No new date for the meeting was announced. The sponsors are expected to say whether the campaign will be officially launched or whether they will directly engage in it without previous announcement. [passage omitted]

Peru

President Garcia Denies Seeking Reelection

PA051950 Lima Panamericana Television Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 5 Nov 87

[Statement by President Alan Garcia in Puno on 4 November—recorded]

[Text] During the past few days some ill-intentioned people have insisted on discussing the reelection issue as if I were seeking to remain in power. I do not want to stay in power; I want to be in the people's hearts, which is my place. I want to have a place in Peru's history by bringing about a revolution. I do not need presidential sashes and position; I am not seeking reelection. I want a revolution for all Peruvians, without exception. [crowd applauds and chants: We want him to stay!]

To the ill intentions of those who think they can destroy my efforts and my presence, I say: Struggle alone because I do not belong and have no part in your spurious and small struggles; what concerns me is history. I am not interested in positions. I can be president in Lima's Government House or I can be a laborer from (Pitilaca). Regardless of whether I am in high or low places, I will continue to be myself and to work for Peru. [crowd chants: Alan, Alan!]

Two Aprista Leaders Murdered in La Libertad

PA051620 Paris AFP in Spanish 2338 GMT 4 Nov 87

[Text] Lima, 4 Nov (AFP)—Two leaders of the government Aprista Party have been murdered by alleged subversive commands in a remote village of Santiago de Chuco, La Libertad Province, Peruvian Government authorities reported today.

Governor Felipe Otiano Fernandez (49) and Aprista leader Claudio Quispe (35) of Chisgon, a village in La Libertad Department in northern Peru, were murdered yesterday. They were machinegunned on the streets—in front of their wives and children—after being charged with "supporting the government," as the signs placed on their bodies read.

In order to cover and ensure their escape, the terrorists set off four explosive charges on the corners of the Plaza de Armas in the town, and they set fire to the governor's office.

In addition, that same guerrilla column that murdered eight peasants in Lucanas, Ayacucho last Monday also set fire to the municipal office and an

important bridge that joins Puquio Province—where Lucanas is located—and Nazca, in the southern coastal area. As a result of the destruction of the bridge, approximately 10,000 residents of many small towns in the region were isolated, the police confirmed today.

The police also pointed out that this is the first time the Shining Path has attacked in this area and killed people since the "armed struggle" began in Ayacucho in 1980.

Meanwhile, a grenade found last night inside a briefcase in the baggage room of Jorge Chavez International Airport was deactivated by a specialized unit of the Republican Guard, an air terminal authority reported.

Uruguay

Iglesias Travels to U.S. for OAS Meeting

PY060125 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish 0000 GMT 7 Nov 87

[Report from Government House by (Emid Suarez Silvera)]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias has left for the United States, where he will attend a meeting of the OAS Supervisory Commission and the OAS General Assembly. Beginning 14 November in Washington, he will get in touch with the members of the Group of Eight in order to conclude the preparations for the summit to be held in Guadalajara [as heard].

PIT-CNT Calls for General Strike 10 November

PY091736 Montevideo Radio El Espectador Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] The PIT-CNT today gave details concerning the 24-hour general strike decreed for tomorrow. We have the remarks of labor leader Daniel Baldassari.

[Begin Baldassari recording] Well, the objective of this news conference is to inform the public with regard to the reasons for the general 24-hour strike called for tomorrow. The strike has been called to press the salary demand and the allowances for retired workers and pensioners. This demand is linked with an Executive Branch decision to grant a 14-percent salary increase for the private sector and to prohibit the transfer of these increases to prices. A similar situation occurs with the readjustment of salaries for public servants as of 1 November; we have had no news on this issue yet. As for the autonomous agency workers, (?they) have not yet been considered by the Executive Branch.

The workers are opposed to the goverment salary policy and the recent sudden utility rate increases, which have caused repercussions known to the public.

The strike called for tomorrow will also support the demand for approval of the laws whose congressional approval has been urged by the PIT-CNT since May 1986. These laws have to do with double overtime rates, a 100-percent paid vacation, and the Christmas bonus.

Other points of our platform include the demands that the PIT-CNT has been permanently upholding, our opposition to the recent budget report vetoes, and our position in defense of the national interest in the state-run companies, in municipal districts, and in the government. [end recording]

Suriname

Suralco Power Plant Hit by Armed Men

FL091925 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 9 Nov 87

[Text] Between Friday night and Saturday last, a group of armed men attacked the Suralco [Suriname Aluminum Company] power house at Moengo. Equipment was destroyed by explosives, which resulted in the bauxite village being left without electricity and water. A bulldozer operator was shot and wounded in his legs, while Suralco workers were warned not to restart the power house or undertake any other working activities. In a letter, the Suralco management informed the minister of natural resources and energy, Harry Kensmil, about the attack.

The management of Suralco is discussing steps it should take following the attack over the weekend on the power house at Moengo. In a letter to the minister of natural resources and energy, Suralco management says that the continuation of such incidents will have consequences on the alumina plant at Parana. A spokesman for the Army declared that the situation at Moengo is under control and the incident will not stagnate [as heard] the activities to normalize the area.

Until yesterday, electricity and water supplies were not restored, while it is not known if the workers reported for work. The Army spokesman said the attack fits in the plan to stop the general elections in the Brokopondo, Sipaliwini, and Marowijne districts.

Prisoner of War Dies; Postmortem Ordered

FL051845 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 5 Nov 87

[Text] The *Suriname News Agency*, SNA, yesterday announced that the prisoner of war (Adipi) died after undergoing surgery. (Adipi) was taken prisoner of war

during mopping up operations by the National Army on October 11th this year. He had declared that four white mercenaries led by Colonel (Vondisimbrook) of the Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service were supporting the actions by the Brunswijk gang in the Pokigron area. (Adipi) also identified the dead body of one of the white mercenaries who was killed during mopping up operations in that area.

Dr (Hatraat) of the National Army told our newsroom that Adipi died on October 19th last. In the meantime, Army [words indistinct] has ordered a postmortem on the body of (Adipi). A coroner's report said (Adipi) died of complications as a result of serious wounds he received.

Labor Minister Pays Visit to Brazil

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[Text] Paramaribo, Nov 6, CANA—Suriname's Labour Minister Andre Koornaar has proposed the establishment of an industrial court to deal with all labour conflicts here.

Koornaar said he hoped that the National Assembly to be chosen in general elections later this month would discuss and adopt the necessary draft law on the court soon after its inauguration.

The minister paid a 7-day visit to Brazil to discuss technical cooperation. Brazil will send a delegation here around mid-November for follow-up discussions.